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Perpetuities, Restraints on Alienability,
and the Duration of Trusts
Ralph A. Newman*
Professor Newman compares and discusses the statutory suspension
rule and the rule against perpetuities in this article, concluding that

there should be only one standardfor determining when a restrainton
alienation lasts too long. The author proposes a new rule which will
eliminate a number of uncertainties and ambiguities in the law of
property and future interests.
The basic principle involved in the title of this discussion is the
common law policy that the owner of the current beneficial interest
in property should have the power of disposition, in order to enable
the property to be used most effectively for the well being of the
community. The rule against perpetuities and the statutory rules
against suspension of the power of alienation are primarily measurements of the permissible duration of restraints. The rule against
perpetuities establishes in addition an intermediate test of suspension,
the criterion of vesting. The vesting criterion is unnecessary since the
presence of any contingent interest generally interferes with the
salability of the property. The vesting criterion is inadequate because it does not cover two very common situations, vested equitable
interests and contingent equitable interests which comply with the
rule, but which nevertheless often produce overlong suspension. The
vesting criterion is confusing to an appalling degree. The statutory
suspension rule covers all the situations in which legal control over
restrictions which interfere with alienation of property is needed; but
its exclusive emphasis on measurement of the permissible duration of
restraints makes it of no help in establishing a test of suspension; and
therefore it fails to afford a solution to the confusion as to the
circumstances under which suspension exists. The simultaneous
existence of both rules in many jurisdictions in the United States
leads to almost hopeless confusion as to both the test and the
permissible period of suspension. There is need for an inclusive rule
which limits the duration of any interest which clogs alienability,
and which defines suspension. An appropriate method of dealing
with the basic problem of establishing a rule for limiting the duration of any sort of restraint which interferes with the ability of the
current owner of the beneficial interest in property to sell or mortgage
*Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University; author,
Newman on Trusts (2d ed. 1955).
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it if the need should arise would be a return to the common law
policy, supplemented by the establishment, either by judicial decision
or preferably by statute, of a permissible period during which restraints on alienability may last.
Owners of property often wish, in giving it to members of their
families, to establish controls over the successive enjoyment of the
property or the subsequent devolution of its ownership. This desire
is opposed to the social interest that property be freely disposable
by a current absolute owner. The law of property thus has to deal
with two antithetical factors: on the one hand, a deeply felt individual
desire to establish controls over the future benefits or devolution
of property after ownership has been transferred; and on the other
hand, a strong social policy that ownership be unrestricted so that in
case of necessity the property can be sold or mortgaged in accordance
with the wishes of the current owner of the beneficial interest. In the
civil law systems, the social interest that property be free from
restrictions which might interfere with its alienation and that ownership be indivisible overrides the individual desire to attach restrictions
which will be effective after ownership is transferred.' In those
legal systems, in the rare instances in which successive limitations
of property are permitted, legal controls over the period during which
restrictions on enjoyment or alienation will be enforced are unnecessary because, as was the case in the common law system until shortly
before the Statute of Uses, future interests can be created only in
favor of persons who are living when the property is originally transferred. In the common law system, future contingent estates are
recognized as performing a useful function in giving the opportunity
for making reasonable provision for the enjoyment or devolution of
property in accordance with conditions which may arise in the future.
In the case of restrictions on alienation caused by the creation of
future interests, the common law has reached a compromise between
the desire of the owner of property to control the enjoyment of the
property and to provide for its subsequent devolution of ownership,
and the social policy against such restrictions. The compromise which
has been reached is to permit the imposition of such restrictions for
limited periods of time.
There are two sorts of legal controls in the common law system
over attempts to limit the right of enjoyment or the right of the
disposition of property by the transferee of some present beneficial
]%.FkENCH Cirvi CODE art. 807, 1048, 1082. The French Civil Code art. 544
defines the right of property as the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most
absolute manner. See also FRENCH Cirvm CODiE art. 537; LLOYD, PUBLIC POLICY; A
COmPA.ATIVE STuDy IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH LAW 18-20 (1953). The codifiers of
the New York Revised Statutes of 1830 set before themselves as their ideal of simplicity
the French law of real estate.
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interest. One sort of control is to declare invalid such limitations on
the power to dispose of the property. The other type of legal control
is to limit, in the case of contingent legal interests and of all interests
in trust, the period of time during which the power of alienation may
be suspended as the result of restrictions imposed by the former
owner. The application of the first type of control depends on the
nature of the restriction and on the nature of the estate to which
the restriction is attached. Some restrictions make the attempted
alienation ineffective and do not result in the forfeiture of the
ownership of the estate; others result in the forfeiture of ownership
of the estate if the restriction is sought to be violated. In the case of
estates of inheritance, either legal or equitable, both types of restrictions are invalid. 2 It is for this reason that in states where
trusts are deemed to clog alienability there may not be any trust of
a fee. In the case of legal life estates, restrictions of the first type,
called disabling restraints, are usually invalid;3 but restrictions which
result in the forfeiture of the ownership of the estate and the passing
of ownership to another person are sometimes allowed. 4 Restrictions
of either type attached to legal interests are comparatively rare. The
second type of control applies to either legal or equitable interests.
In the case of absolute legal interests, the rule against perpetuities
accomplishes the public policy in favor of alienability by curtailing
the period during which the vesting of future interests may be
postponed. However, since successive limitations of legal interests
are comparatively rare, most of the problems dealing with the effect
of provisions which interfere with the alienability of property arise
in connection with trusts.
Restrictions attached to equitable interests arising out of the creation of a trust must be such that they will cease to be operative within
periods of time prescribed by law. It is this type of restriction which
is the particular subject of the following discussion. The end which
the law seeks to accomplish is approached, in the case of equitable
interests, in two ways: by requiring the vesting of future interests
within the period established by law, or by requiring that any conditions to absolute ownership which would interfere in any way
with the sale of the property must be such that they will cease to be
effective within the prescribed period. The former method, which
requires the timely vesting of future interests, is called the rule
against perpetuities. The latter method is called the policy against
2. GRAY, RESTAINTS ON ALIENATION § 279 (2d ed. 1895); LrrTLETON, TENUMns §
360 (Wambaugh ed. 1903); Statute of Westminster III (Quia Emptores), 1290, 18
Edw. 1, c. 1, establishing the right of fee owners to alienate.
3. GRAY, RFSTRAiNTS ON ALiENATION § 134 (2d ed. 1895); Schnebly, Restraints on
Alienation, 44 YALE L.J. 961, 989-95 (1935).
4. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 46; Schnebly, supra note 3, at 991-94.
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suspension of the power of alienation. Later, in modem times, this
latter policy has been expressed in a statutory rule against suspension
of the power of alienation.
Of the two methods of curtailing the period during which provisions
interfering with the alienation of property will be legally effective,
the method of limiting the permissible period to a period on the
termination of which all contingent interests must become vested, if
they are ever to do so, is, although itself ancient, the more recent.
Long before the rule against perpetuities, as it has been called ever
since it was originated in a dictum of Lord Nottingham in 1681,5 a
basic policy against protracted suspension of the power of alienation,
which might have the effect of removing property from participation
in commerce, had become well established. To this policy was probably due the doctrine, even though future estates had been a part
of the English law of property since the Norman Conquest, that
only vested remainders were permitted. When this policy was relaxed
shortly before the enactment of the Statute of Uses in 1535, the only
relaxation at common law was to permit remainders, necessarily contingent, to the heirs of persons who were living when the estates in
remainder were created. In equity, for about a century before the
Statute, other contingent interests had been recognized; and after
the Statute almost numberless possibilities of contingent interests were
adopted, as the effect of the Statute, into the common law in the form
of contingent estates or executory interests. Today in England the
only method of restricting the permissible duration of such interests
is the rule against perpetuities through requiring the timely vesting
of contingent interests.
In the United States, commencing with the enacting of the New
York Revised Statutes of 1830,6 another criterion was found for determining the legality of restraints on alienation. The object of the
new statutory method, which is called the rule against suspension
of the power of alienation, is exactly the same as the ultimate object
of the older rule against perpetuities: to assure that after a period
of time which the law determines property encumbered with such
restraints may be restored to participation in commerce. It seems
fairly certain that this new statutory suspension rule was not intended
to be exclusive, but only to supplement the older rule against perpetuities, incorporated into the New York statutory system of real
property law along with the newly formulated rule against suspension. 7 The use of both rules in New York, almost of necessity, has
5. Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Chan. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Cb. 1681).
6. N.Y. Ruv. STAT. part 2, c. 1, tit. 2, §§ 14-23, 63 (1830); id. part 2, c. 4, tit. 4,
§§1,2.
7. Smms, FuTUrETImnnmsrs § 565 (1936); N.Y. RrAL Pnop. LAW §§ 46, 50,
refer to vesting in interest.
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complicated the understanding of the nature of each rule and of
the extent to which the rules have independent effect. Although a
wealth of important legal literature has been written in explanation
of these types of legal controls over the permissible duration of
restrictions on the alienability of property,8 the distinction between
the two rules is not easy to grasp. Sometimes the difficulty in understanding the distinction is due to an incomplete comprehension of the
nature of the tests of suspension which are being compared. For these
reasons it is felt that a survey of the relationship between the vesting
requirement of the rule against perpetuities and the rule against suspension of the power of alienation may be useful, at least to the
extent of emphasizing some of the problems which are involved. It is
the opinion of the writer that the custom in legal writing of resting
each step of reasoning on specific authority tends at times to obscure
what might otherwise have been a clearer approach to the basic problems. At the risk of being thought, possibly with justification, guilty
of a departure from the accepted paths of scholarship, the following
observations are offered as a base for more detailed study by students
of the law who may be desirous of verifying the observations by
independent research.
The core of the rule against perpetuities, which requires that
contingent interests in property, to be valid, must be capable of
vesting within the period of the rule, is that the interest must be
susceptible of becoming unconditional, or absolute, as to ownership
within the prescribed period. 9 The period usually adopted in the
United States is lives in being, including where appropriate any
actual gestation period, and an additional period of twenty-one years
in which the vesting may take place. Unconditional, or absolute,
8. Among the most helpful discussions, in the opinion of the writer, are the following: CHAPLN, SUSPENSION OF T-E POWER OF ALIENATION § 358 (3d ed. 1929);
KALES, ESTATES, FuTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN

ILLINOIS § 658 (2d ed. 1920); Bordwell, Alienability and Perpetuities, 22 IowA L.
REv. 437 (1937); 23 id. at 1 (1937); 24 id. at 635 (1939); 25 id. at 1 (1939); 25 id. at
707 (1940); Cleary, IndestructibleTestamentary Trusts, 43 YALE L.J. 393 (1934); Fraser,
The Rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 6 MINN. L. REV. 560 (1922); Fraser,
The Rule Against Perpetuities; Suspension of the Power of Alienation, 8 MINN. L. REV.
295 (1924); Fraser, The Rules Against Restraints on Alienation, 9 MImN. L. IEv. 314,
341 (1925); Leach, Perpetuitiesin a Nutshell, 51 HAEv. L. REv. 638 (1938); Morray,
The Rule Against Prolonged Indestructibility of Private Trusts, 44 ILL. L. REv. 467
(1949); Schnebly, Restraints on Alienation, 44 YALE L.J. 1380, 1404 (1935); Simes,
Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?, 52 MICH. L. REv. 179 (1953); Sweet,
Contingent Remainders and Other Possibilities, 27 YALE L.J. 979 (1918); Sweet, The
Monstrous Regiment of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 18 Juam. REV. 132 (1906);
Turrentine, The Suspension Rule and Other Statutory Restrictions on Trusts and
Future Interests in California, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 262, 284 (1958); Whiteside, Suspension of the Power of Alienation in New York, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 167 (1928).
9. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrrEs § 201'(2d ed. 1906); Snvms, FutmRE
INTERESTS § 567 (1936).
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ownership requires that the ownership must arise in ascertained or
immediately ascertainable persons and that this ownership must be
certain in the sense that there must be no further condition to complete ownership. In all jurisdictions, if these two conditions are met,
the estate does not violate the rule against perpetuities, 10 the reason
being that if the future interests in the property are such that they
must vest, if they are ever to do so, within the period of the rule,
the property will not remain out of effective participation in commerce
longer than the prescribed period.
The rule against suspension of the power of alienation, like the
rule against perpetuities, is designed to restore property to commerce
within the prescribed period, but this result is accomplished, in the
rule's original form, by the imposition of a different test of alienability
than the test established in the rule against perpetuities. The test of
the rule against perpetuities is that of practical possibility of sale,
not legal possibility. When the owners of a future estate become
identified, they can sell their interests, and from the viewpoint of legal
possibility the property is potentially restored to commerce. If, however, their ownership is not absolute, that is, unconditional, the
salability of the property will be impaired because by the time they
agree on the valuation of the contingent interest, the possibility of
sale may well have disappeared; or the parties may fail ever to
agree." Thus the property, although legally salable if the parties
agree on how the proceeds of the potential sale are to be divided, is
as a practical matter taken out of the market. Expressed in another
way, the property, although legally salable, is as a practical matter
unsalable. As Professor Powell has stated the distinction, the rule
against perpetuities is concerned with the fact of alienability as well
as the possibility.' 2 The suspension rule is concerned only with the
legal possibility.
There has been a wide divergence of views on the part of legislators, judges, and text writers as to the desirability or necessity for
the adoption or retention of either rule. Most commentators have
refrained from expressing an opinion on this question. Among those
who have ventured to do so, Rundell1 3 and Turrentine 14 favor the
10. Sams, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 567 (1936).

11. GRAY, THE Rui- AGAmsT PEm', rurEl s § 268 (2d ed. 1906); Fraser, The
Rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 6 MINN. L. REv. 560, 573 (1922).
12. Powell, Suspension of the Power of Alienation, 30 CoLtm. L. REv. 140 (1930).
13. Rundell, The Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation, 19 MicH. L. REv.
235 (1921).
14. Turrentine, The Suspension Rule and Other Statuton Restrictions on Trusts and
Future Interests in California, 9 HASTNGS L.J. 262, 284 (1958).
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retention of the suspension rule; Fraser,'- Bogert and Powell,7
favor the rule against perpetuities. Simes seems to suggest that the
suspension rule is preferable.' 8 Rundell and Fraser point out the
undesirability of two rules, each of which is considerably complex
and undoubtedly, to some extent at least, overlaps the area covered
by the other rule. Fraser has suggested that if at all possible both
of these rules should be replaced by a single rule that any limitation
which might remain contingent beyond the period allowed is void.
Even such a rule would not cover all situations, however, in which
control is needed-for example, restraints on alienation caused by
indestructible trusts of vested interests, in which some limitation on
the period of permissible duration may be desirable. The single rule,
if any such is to be found, must be of wider application than to cover
merely contingent interests.
It is important to compare in some detail the tests by which
alienability is to be determined in the two rules designed to curtail
the permissible period of suspension of the power of alienation. Essentially the difference, as has already been stated, is that according
to the statutory suspension rule, all that is required is the legal
possibility of sale by all the owners of interests in the property, acting
in concert, of an interest which, in the hands of the new owner, will
be a fee simple absolute in the case of real property, or in the case
of personal property, an absolute ownership. According to the rule
against perpetuities, which operates through requiring timely vesting
of contingent interests, such a sale must be not only legally possible,
but practicable as well. For this reason, the existence of a future
interest which, although certain as to the identity of the owners, is
uncertain as to their absolute ownership because of uncertainty of the
occurrence of an event the happening of which is a condition to such
absolute ownership, suspends the alienability of the property. In the
area of the widest application of both rules, trusts, the tests of the two
rules have become almost identical. Historically, in New York, where
the rule against suspension in its statutory form originated, all that
the suspension rule required was the legal possibility of sale. The
New York Court of Appeals was faced with the necessity of interpreting a statute which might have been phrased in more traditional
terms and which introduced a concept of absolute ownership that
was new as to personal property, at least in its verbal formulation.

15. Fraser, The Rationale of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 6 MINN. L. REv. 560
(1922).
16. 1A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEs § 219 (1935).
17. Powell, Perpetuitiesin Arizona, 1 A=uz. L. REV. 225 (1960).
18. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed?, 52 MICH. L. tEv. 179, 193
(1953).
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The court in early cases 19 drew a distinction between the test of
suspension of the power of alienation, which it said required in the
case of personal property only the legal possibility of a transfer by
the combined action of identified persons who owned interests in the
property, and the vesting test applicable to real property, which
imposed the dual requirement of identification of the owners and
also unconditional ownership of the property. In the course of time,
beginning within six years after the enactment of the Revised Statutes
of 1830, the suspension rule was broadened by judicial decision in
New York so as to require, in the case of equitable interests in trust,
not only certainty of the identity of the owners of the various interests,
but elimination of impediments to sale caused by the presence of an
indestructible trust as well.20 This extension of the concept of suspension of the power of alienation plainly introduced into the test
of suspension matters arising from impediments to sale created by
circumstances other than uncertainty as to the identity of the owners
of the interests. Thereafter, there was no sensible reason for excluding
from the category of impediments to alienability under the suspension
test any other circumstance, such as, for example, the necessity for
the happening of some future event before ownership would be
absolute-cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. Thus the tests of
suspension in the case of equitable interests according to the rule
against suspension and the tests according to the rule against perpetuities coalesced, and there remained no further need for both
rules. This evolution of the suspension rule has apparently gone
unnoticed so far as its effect on the vesting rule is concerned, although
the enlarged conception of the suspension rule renders the vesting
rule superfluous. The function of the rule against perpetuities has
thus contracted in an important area of its operation, contingent
equitable interests, to that of an adjunct to the statutory rule against
protracted suspension of the power of alienation, which was precisely
the function of the rule against perpetuities in relation to the ancient
19. In re Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909); Sawyer v. Cubby, 146
N.Y. 192, 40 N.E. 869 (1895); Nellis v. Nellis, 99 N.Y. 505, 3 N.E. 59 (1885).
20. In re Hitchcocek's Will, 222 N.Y. 57, 118 N.E. 220 (1917); Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59 (1908); Kalish v. Kalish, 166 N.Y. 368, 59
N.E. 917 (1901); Allen v. Allen, 149 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E. 626 (1896); Brewer v.
Brewer, 11 Hun 147 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1877), aff'd sub nora. Bremer v. Penniman, 72
N.Y. 603 (1878); Moore v. Littel, 41 N.Y. 66 (1869); Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N.Y.
394, 405 (1855); Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61 (N.Y. Ct. of Err. 1836); Coster v.
Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (N.Y. Ct. of Err. 1835); Equitable Trust Co. v. Pratt, 117
Misc. 108, 193 N.Y. Supp. 152 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Hobson v. Hale, 95 N.Y. 588 (1884)
(dictum); Robert v. Coming, 89 N.Y. 225 (1882) (dictum); Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y.
96 (1858) (dictum); In re Maltman's Estate, 229 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922).
The rule has been codified in California. CAL. Civ. CODE § 771 (Deering 1949). Professor Simes has noted the evolving construction of the suspension rule, although
without particularizing as to the precise nature of the evolution. SnI,.s, op. cit. supra
note 10, § 566.
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common law policy against protracted suspension. The gradual
evolution of the statutory suspension rule is by no means surprising.
What would be surprising, as Professor Gray has remarked with
reference to the evolution of the rule against perpetuities, 2 1 would be
that the full significance of the newly evolved statutory suspension
rule would have been understood in all its ramifications as soon
as it was promulgated. Courts have continued, however, to re-state
both rules in the terms of their original formulation with respect to
the criteria of suspension with each rule having, in consequence, a
field of operation, that of contingent equitable interests, in which
both rules operate concurrently with almost identical effect.
Thirteen other jurisdictions, 2 commencing soon after the establishment of the suspension rule in New York in 1830, adopted it, seemingly without full understanding of its complete meaning and function
or of its relation to the rule against perpetuities. In all those jurisdictions the rule against perpetuities was already in force, in their
common law. Three of those states abandoned the rule against perpetuities and established the suspension rule as the exclusive test of
alienability.P In two of the states which adopted the suspension
rule, it was subsequently abandoned'by statute.24 In Kentucky and
Oklahoma the statutes have sometimes been interpreted as merely
declaratory of the common law rule against perpetuities,2 but it
seems probable that this impression was the result of the frequent
overlapping of the two different tests of suspension. In most of the
states which adopted the suspension rule there were thereafter in
existence two different designs for handling the problem of establishing limits to the period during which property may be taken out of
effective participation in commerce. In some of the states which have
21. Gray, Remoteness of Charitable Gifts, 7 HAv. L. BEv. 406 (1894).
22. Aiz. REv. STAT. § 33-261 (1956); CAL. CIV. CODE § 715 (Deering 1949);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-102 (1961); IDAO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1949); IND. STAT.
§§ 51-101, -103 (Bums 1933); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.220 (1955); MicE. Comvp.
LAws 1929, § 12934 (1929); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.13 (1947); MONT. REV. CODES
§ 67-406 (1962); N.D. CENTURY CODE § 47-02-27 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60,
§ 31 (1949); S.D. CODE § 51.0231 (1939); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.14 (1957).
23. Idaho [see Locklear v. Tucker, 69 Idaho 84, 203 P.2d 380 (1949)]; Minnesota
[Mineral Land Inv. Co. v. Bishop Iron Co., 134 Minn. 412, 159 N.W. 966 (1916)];
Wisconsin [Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 468, 213 N.W. 320 (1927)]. In Arizona and
Iowa the decisions raise doubt as to whether or not the suspension rule supersedes
the rule against perpetuities. Lowell v. Lowell, 29 Ariz. 138, 240 Pac. 280 (1925);
Jordan v. Woddin, 93 Iowa 453, 61 N.W. 948 (1895); of. Todhunter v. Des Moines,
I. & Mo. R.R., 58 Iowa 205, 12 N.W. 267 (1882).
24. IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-105, -109 (Bums 1951); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.14
(1957).
25. In re Walker's Estate, 179 Okla. 442, 66 P.2d 88 (1937). In Kentucky the
statute is deemed to be merely declaratory of the rule against perpetuities, Fidelity &
Columbia Trust Co. v. Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S.W. 357 (1924); Brown v.
Columbia Fin. & Trust Co., 123 Ky. 775, 97 S.W. 421 (1906); see Roberts, Kentucky's
Statute Against Perpetuities, 16 Ky. L.J. 97 (1927).
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adopted the suspension rule, superimposed on the common law
rule against perpetuities, the coalescence of the two tests of suspen-

sion has been recognized, but only in the case of equitable interests
and not in the case of contingent legal interests. Such a distinction
is without any sound basis, and should not be perpetuated. The
enlarged construction of the test of alienability in the suspension
rule should be applied also in the case of contingent legal interests,

which would make the vesting rule superfluous as an independent
test of suspension. The New York courts have very properly aban-

doned any distinction, with regard to the test of alienability, between
vested and contingent equitable interests; and any such distinction

between contingent legal and equitable interests is equally pointless. If this distinction were to be abandoned, the same test of
suspension would be applied to absolute legal interests and to all
interests in trust. Since in the ten states, including New York,
where both rules are in force,2 7 the rule against remote vesting
answers the requirements of identified ownership and unconditional
ownership of legal interests, the suspension rule, for the purpose of
requiring unconditional ownership within the prescribed period is

unnecessary in the case of absolute legal estates. This is perhaps the
reason for its abandonment in some states in which it was previously
in force. In those states, and also, of course, in the large majority
of jurisdictions in the United States where the suspension rule has
never been in force, the only clearly formulated rule against the

protracted removal of privately owned property from commerce by
26. In re Maltman's Estate, 195 Cal. 643, 234 Pac. 898 (1925); Grand Rapids
Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922).
27. In addition to Wisconsin, where the suspension rule is the only rule in force,
it is in force along with the vesting rule in ten other jurisdictions: Arizona, California,
District of Columbia, Minnesota, Idaho, New York, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
and South Dakota. In Arizona and Minnesota it applies only to real property. In
California a statute, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 715.2, 716 (Deering 1949) expressly provides
for both rules. In Michigan and Indiana, former superseding statutes have been
repealed, and the common law rule against perpetuities substituted. See note 24
supra. The statutes in Montana, South Dakota, North Dakota, and the District of
Columbia have not been definitively construed. Hazen v. American Security & Trust
Co., 265 Fed. 447 (D.C. Cir. 1920); In re Murphy's Estate, 99 Mont. 114, 43 P.2d 233
(1935); Hagen v. Sacrison, 19 N.D. 160, 123 N.W. 518 (1909); In re Havsgaard's
Estate, 59 S.D. 26, 238 N.W. 130 (1931). In thirty-three states the rule against
perpetuities alone, or in conjunction with the suspension rule, is in force: Alabama,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. In six states by statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-95 (1958);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. c. 160, § 27 (1959); MAss. GEN. LAws c. 184A, § 1 (1955); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 301.4, 301.5 (1950); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1959);

WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.050 (1959). And in New Hampshire by judicial decision
actual- events, rather than possibilities, control, Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98
N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953), noted in 67 HAnv. L. REv. 355 (1953).
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reason of restrictions on its alienation is the vesting requirement,
sometimes incorporating the common law rule by statute and sometimes merely continuing the common law rule without the aid of
statute. In England the rule against perpetuities is the only rule
against remoteness of vesting.2 It is exclusively in effect in thirtyseven American jurisdictions. Three more have rules resembling it.29
Has the suspension rule an area of operation different from the
area of operation of the rule against perpetuities? The question may
be divided into consideration of vested legal estates, contingent
legal estates, and equitable estates of both kinds.
I. VESTED LEGAL ESTATES

Since the vesting requirement of the rule against perpetuities is
satisfied if all the future interests are susceptible of becoming vested
within the prescribed period, whereas the suspension rule applies
even to vested interests, it might seem that the suspension rule
would operate in a situation in which the rule against perpetuities
does not. Although this is true as an abstract proposition, it will
readily be seen that the suspension rule even in the case of vested
absolute interests has no independent effect. Vested interests, apart
from trusts, do not suspend the power of alienation; and therefore
the rule against suspension does not apply, any more than does the
rule against perpetuities. Any restraint on alienation is dealt with
either as terminating the ownership of the estate to which it is
attached if the restraint is sought to be violated or as rendering
ineffective any attempted alienation, leaving the ownership otherwise
undisturbed; or it is limited in its effect, in some jurisdictions, to life
estates. There is no other control provided by law, or necessary, over
such types of restraint on alienation, because the restraint can be
made legally ineffective without destroying the estate to which the
restriction has been attached. This is not so in the case of contingent
future interests, where it is the very nature of the interest itself which
creates the suspension; and to invalidate the suspension completely,
in contrast to limiting its permissible duration, would be to destroy
the contingent estate and preclude the benefits which in our legal
system are deemed to follow from this method of ownership of estates
in property.
II. CONTINGENT LEGAL INTERESTS

Likewise in the case of contingent legal estates, both rules have
identical effect. The rule against perpetuities precludes the remote
28. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Ceo. 5, c. 20, § 163.

29. Comment, Recent Changes in Statutory Rules Against Prepetuities, 38 CORNELL
L.Q. 543 n.4 (1953).
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vesting which would unduly prolong the suspension; but it is also
indisputable that as long as the contingency lasts, the future interest,
by reason of its contingent nature, suspends the power of alienation
of the entire property. Both rules in the case of contingent legal
estates lead to, the same result.
III. EQUITABLE INTERESTS
A. EXIsTENcE OF SUSPENSION
In determining whether a trust in itself creates a clog on alienation,
several problems must be taken into account: whether a power of
sale in the trustee cures the difliculty; 30 whether a separate power to

assign the equitable interests is necessary in order to remove the
difficulty, in which case spendthrift trusts would in themselves create
a clog; and, the most important consideration, whether a trust, even
apart from any spendthrift restrictions, is in itself indestructible.
Obviously only indestructible trusts clog alienation; if all the beneficiaries are of full age and capacity and own among them vested
and indefeasible interests, or if the owners of all contingent interests
are living and identified and are of full age and capacity, statutes in
many states permit the termination of inter vivos trusts by the settlor
with their consent.3 ' In the case of testamentary trusts or inter vivos
trusts in the absence of statute, the overwhelming weight of authority,
since the decision of Claflin v. Claflin in 1889, is that they are indestructible.m2 Under this view, in jurisdictions where indestructible
trusts are deemed to impair the alienability of the property, if the
suspension rule is in force, a trust cannot last longer than the lifetimes
of persons who were living when the trust began and in some states
30. Powell, Perpetuities in Arizona, 1 Aiuz. L. REV. 225, 238 (1960), feels that
a power of sale makes the property in a trust alienable. There is a public policy

against permitting an indestructible trust of long duration. Internal attack will be
allowed. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND),

TRUSTS § 62 (1959).

An attempt to create per-

petually indestructible interests was held invalid in First Nat'l Bank v. Rice, 101
N.J. Eq. 520, 139 Ad. 396 (ch. 1927). See also KALEs, ESTATES, FtrruE INTERESTS
AND ILLEGAL CONDinONS AND REsTmusr IN ILLINOIS § 658 (2d ed. 1920). Contra,
Simes, Is the Rule Against PerpetuitiesDoomed?, 52 MicH. L. REv. 179, 192 (1953)

(referring to the stagnation of risk investment caused by trusts); Cleary, Indestructible
Testamentary Trusts, 43 YALE L.J. 393 (1934); Morray, The Rule Against Prolonged
Indestructibility of Private Trusts, 44 IL.. L. REv. 467 (1949).
31. N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 23; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 118; CAL. CIV. CODE §
2280 (Deering 1949); Oyr A. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.41 (1949); TEx. Civ. STAT. tit.
125A, art. 7425 b-41 (Vernon 1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6 (1950). See also In re
Mowinkel's Estate, 130 Neb. 10, 263 N.W. 488 (1935).
32. Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889); accord, RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
§ 337 (1935); see KALEs, op. cit. supra note 30, § 288; Annot., 45 A.L.R. 743 (1926).
Gray and Kales differ as to the time when the suspension starts; see Gray, Note, 19

H-Lv. L. REv. 604, 605 (1906); Kales, Several Problems of Gray's Rule Against
Perpetuities, Second Edition, 20 HAsv. L. REv. 192, 202-04 (1907); Cleary, Indestructible Testamentary Trusts, 43 YALE L.J. 393, 400 (1934).
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an additional period measured in years. In England perhaps it is
because trusts are not ordinarily indestructible3 that their existence
is not considered to suspend the power of alienation, and thus they
are not considered to violate the common law policy against
unduly prolonged suspension. The purpose of the trust, of course,
must also be considered, since after its purpose has been carried
out, it is terminable at the desire of the beneficiaries. This question
is itself an extremely complicated one, and different presumptions as
to the probable purpose of the settlor will affect the decision on
the problem of terminability.4 If an indestructible trust is deemed
to clog alienability, there is authority to the effect, even in the
absence of a statutory suspension rule, that the duration of the trust
35
should be limited. Gray, Kales, and Scott argue for such a principle.

There are a few dicta and decisions both ways.3 Bogert feels that
the majority of the dicta announce an American policy that indestructible trusts must be limited in duration, even in the absence
37
of a statutory suspension rule.

B. DURATION OF SUSPENSION
The principal difference in the effect of the two rules is in regard
to the duration of trusts. It seems to be assumed in states which
have adopted the statutory suspension rule while retaining the rule
33. In re Chardon, [1928] 1 Ch. 464; In re Couturier, [1907] 1 Ch. 470;
Saunders v. Vautier, Cr. & Ph. 240, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (Ch. 1841); Josselyn v. Josselyn,
9 Sim. 63, 59 Eng. Rep. 281 (Ch. 1837). The English courts have never decided the
problem in the situation where there are contingent equitable interests which preclude
alienation.
34. See NmvAN, TRusTs 481-88 (2d ed. 1955); 3 Scorr, TnusTs § 337 (2d ed.
1956); Cleary, Indestructible Testamentary Trusts, 43 YALE L.J. 393, 406-11 (1934).
35. See GnAY, TnE RuLE AGAINST PEaP rurnrzs § 121 ii (3d ed. 1915); KALES, op.
cit. supra note 30, §§ 739-41; Scott, Control of Property by the Dead, 65 U. PA. L.
REv. 632, 649 (1916). If an absolute fee in possession cannot be conveyed, either
because of a contingent interest or because of an indestructible trust, there is a
suspension of ownership.
36. In the case of indestructible trusts, whether there is or is not a statutory rule
against suspension, the period during which the trust may last is limited. Van Epps
v. Arbuckle, 332 Il. 551, 558, 164 N.E. 1, 4 (1928), analyzed in 43 YALE L.J. 393,
402 (1934); Loomis v. Laramie, 286 Mich. 707, 282 N.W. 876 (1938); In re Shallcross'
Estate, 200 Pa. 122, 49 AUt. 936 (1901); In re Howard's Estate, 54 Pa. D. & C. 312
(Orph. Ct. Lycoming County 1945). Other examples are cited in 1A BoGEzr, op. cit.
supra note 16, § 218 n.55 and in KALE, op. cit. supra note 30, § 569 n.54. In these
states there was a statutory suspension rule in force. Where no statutory rule was in
force, the same result was reached in dicta in the following cases: Barnum v. Barnum,
26 Md. 119, 90 Am. Dec. 88 (1866); Southard v. Southard, 210 Mass. 347, 96 N.E.
941 (1911); Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 229 (1949), noted in 48
Micn. L. REv. 235 (1949); and see Alexander v. House, 133 Conn. 725, 54 A.2d 510
(1947). Contra, that a trust is not limited in duration: Turner v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 148 Md. 371, 129 Ad. 294 (1925); Deacon v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
271 Mo. 669, 197 S.W. 261 (1917); Forbringer v. Romano, 10 N.J. Super. 175,
76 A.2d 825 (Super. Ct. 1950).
37. IA BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 16, § 218.
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against perpetuities that the measuring period of both rules is that
which is enacted as the permissible period of suspension. The sole
exception was California for a long period prior to 1951; there the
allowable periods for vesting and for suspension were different, the
suspension rule leaving out the additional twenty-one year term for
vesting permitted by the local rule against perpetuities. Thus, during
this period of its legislative history a bequest to A's unborn heir, to
take effect within twenty-one years after A's death, would be good
under the rule against perpetuities but bad under the suspension
rule. This discrepancy was corrected by the enactment of a statute
in 1951 establishing identical periods, lives plus twenty-one years.
As Professor Turrentine has pointed out,38 where the periods differ,
the rules have different effects in regard to the permissible duration
of the restraint. What seems to have been completely overlooked in
all the jurisdictions which have adopted the statutory suspension
rule, is that the rules have different effects on the permissible duration
of trusts even though the measurement period is the same. In the case
of equitable interests in indestructible trusts in jurisdictions in which
such trusts are deemed to suspend the alienability of the property,
the rule against perpetuities, which requires only the timely vesting
of contingent interests, permits a trust to last during the entire
lifetime of the owner of the last contingent interest to vest. The
suspension rule cuts down the period during which a trust may last
to the period established by the suspension rule, for example lives
in being plus twenty-one years. The two rules, although they use the
same measure, apply the measure to different situations. The rule
against perpetuities measures the period between the time when the
trust begins and the time when the last contingent equitable interest
vests, or must vest; and the trust, so far as the rule against perpetuities
is concerned, may continue thereafter indefinitely-actually since
there can be no trust of a fee or for an indefinite succession of lives,
for the lifetime of the owner of that interest. The suspension rule,
on the contrary, measures the period during which the trust may last,
from the time when the trust begins to the time when it ends. According to the rule against suspension, the trust, since there can be
no trust of a fee, must end at the death of persons whose lives
measure its duration or within a term of years thereafter; and contingent life interests, in the view of the matured test of suspension
of the rule against suspension, in themselves suspend the power of
alienation. According to the rule against perpetuities, if the ultimate
remainder in trust will become vested within twenty-one years after
38. See Turrentine, The Suspension Rule, 9 HAsNGs L.J. 262, 267 (1958). The
statute correcting the discrepancy is CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.2 (the perpetuities rule),
and § 715.1 (the suspension rule) (Deering 1949).
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the death of persons who were living when it commenced, there is no
legal impediment to its further continuation. The suspension rule
thus has the effect of shortening the permissible duration of trusts by
eliminating the lifetime, or part of it, of the owner of the last contingent interest to vest, even though it vests in time.39 It should be
noted that even in the absence of a statutory suspension rule, the
duration of a trust is nevertheless limited by the rule that there can
be no trust of an estate of inheritance, that is to say, of a fee, 40 or
for an indefinite succession of lives; and it is also limited by the
common law policy against prolonged suspension of the power of
alienation, which in itself establishes a limitation on the permissible
duration of trusts to a period probably the same as the period during
41
which a valid vesting may occur under the rule against perpetuities.
4
A private trust may not last indefinitely anywhere. 2 This is merely
43
the necessary application of the policy illustrated in Taltarum's Case
and other devices of escape from De Donis to equitable estates. The
39. Examples of trusts to endure for a life not in being, making them invalid in the
suspension states, are Otto v. Union Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 2d 233, 238 P.2d 961 (1951),
noted in 4 STAN. L. REv. 598 (1952); In re Maltman's Estate, 195 Cal. 643, 234 Pac.
898 (1925) (trust bad under suspension rule although good under the rule against
perpetuities); In re Van Wyck's Estate, 185 Cal. 49, 196 Pac. 50 (1921); In re
Durand's Will, 250 N.Y. 45, 164 N.E. 737 (1928); In re Homer's Will, 237 N.Y.
489, 143 N.E. 655 (1924).
An example of a trust good during the minority of unborn beneficiaries, under the
rule against perpetuities, is Sheridan v. Blume, 290 II. 508, 125 N.E. 353 (1919).
This involved a trust for the children of the testator's daughter until the youngest
child reached the age of 21 years. Held, trust was not distributable until after the
death of the daughter, to allow for the birth of other children. In Camden Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Scott, 121 N.J. Eq. 366, 189 AUt. 653 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937)
a trust to continue until unborn grandchildren reached the age of thirty was sustained
against external attack. A trust may continue for the lives of after-born beneficiaries,
if they are born within lives in being. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 378 (1944).
It is not accurate to say, as was said in Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321, 329 (1908)
that "the utmost extent of a trust at common law" is lives in being plus 21 years.
Contra, and expressing the weight of authority, Hazen v. American See. Co., 265
Fed. 447 (D.C. Cir. 1920); Snms, Ftrrun INTEREsTs § 557 (1936). There are
occasional statutes limiting the duration of trusts, however. An example is MuNN.
STAT. ANN. § 501.11 (Supp. 1961), providing that a trust shall not continue for a
period longer than lives in being and 21 years after the death of the survivor of the
lives. In states where there is no suspension rule, trusts may endure for a life not
in being; see Sheridan v. Blume, supra note 38.
40. RESTATEMENT, TRusTs § 62 (1935).
41. Both CRAY, op. cit. supra note 35, § 121c-i, and KALEs, op. cit. supra note 30,
§§ 732-38 feel that trusts which are to continue beyond the period of the rule against
perpetuities are terminable by the beneficiaries, not by virtue of the rule, but under
another rule adopting the same period; accord, Cleary, Indestructible Testamentary
Trusts, 43 YALE L.J. 393, 400 (1934).
42. SiiEs, FuTmR INTEREsTs § 403 (1936); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 381 (1944).
In a few states there are different periods for the suspension of legal and of equitable
interests. An example is OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 172 (1949) (duration of trusts
is 21 years or lives in being); cf. id. § 175.47 (suspension period for legal interests
is lives in being and 21 years thereafter).
43. Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, 19 (1472).
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vesting requirement of the rule against perpetuities, although it
applies to the beginning of interests, not to their termination, nevertheless establishes a terminal period at which a trust must, to be valid,
end. It is impossible for a trust to be valid unless the equitable
interests of the beneficiaries are so limited that they are susceptible
of timely vesting under the rule against perpetuities. Even in the
absence of a rule against perpetuities, the period of permissible
duration of an indestructible trust is the lives of human beings
who are alive when the trust is established, or the lives of persons
as yet unborn but whose birth will take place, if ever, by the end of
the lifetimes of living persons or by the end of a gestation period
following such lives, or within some relatively brief additional period. 44
The difference in the effect of the two rules, arising from their
different terminal points of measurement, can be observed in a
situation such as that which was present in a Wisconsin case, In re
Butter's Will.4 5 There a trust had been established for the testator's
sister and her children until the youngest child should reach the age
of thirty years. Since all the remainders must of necessity vest, if
at all, by the end of the lifetime of the testator's sister, who was
living when the trust began, the vesting rule, in a state where that
rule was in effect, would not have impaired the validity of the remainder. In Wisconsin trusts are not deemed to clog alienability;
but had the case arisen in one of the many states in which the existence of a trust suspends the power of alienation, the application of
the suspension rule, which was in effect in Wisconsin, would have
cut short the last remainder to vest. However, the remainder was
not invalidated by the rule against perpetuities, and the trust, as far
as that rule was concerned, might have lasted for the entire lifetime
of the remaindermen. In jurisdictions where a trust is deemed to
suspend the power of alienation, the vesting rule requires that the
trust must come to an end at the termination of the last life to vest.
The suspension rule, on the other hand, measures the permissible
duration from the commencement of the trust, as does the rule against
perpetuities, but does not permit the trust to last longer than the
prescribed period, usually slightly different from the permissible
duration of suspension in the case of contingent legal interests at
common law.46 Stated another way, in a trust, after all the beneficial
interests have become vested, the rule against perpetuities is not
concerned with its duration, although the trust must necessarily end
at the death of the owner of the last interest which vests in time.
Thus, the two rules lead to different permissible periods of duration.
44. Snvms & SmIrH, FuTuRE INTEREsTS § 1391 (2d ed. 1956).
45. In re Butter's Will, 239 Wis. 249, 1 N.W.2d 87 (1942).
46. N.Y. Rr.L PRop. LA-w § 42.
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For example, in a trust for A for life, then for A's eldest child, as yet
unborn, for life, the remainder to A's eldest child will vest, if at all,
immediately at the expiration of a life in being, the lifetime of A.
Thus, the trust will be valid for the whole lifetime of A's eldest child,
as far as the rule against perpetuities is concerned, because his estate
must vest, if it vests at all, by the end of the lifetime of A, who was
living when the trust began. The effect of the suspension rule, however, is that the estate for A's eldest child, and perhaps in consequence
the whole trust, is invalid because the suspension of the power of
alienation, in jurisdictions where a trust is deemed to suspend such
power, might according to the terms of the trust last for a longer
period than lifetimes of persons who were living when the trust
began, or twenty-one years thereafter, since A's son might live longer
than twenty-one years. The difference in the effect of the two rules
may be illustrated by a further example. Let us suppose a trust for
A for life, then for B for life, remainder to B's eldest child for life,
remainder to B's second child for life. The ultimate remainder to the
second child may not vest within twenty-one years after lives in being,
since the eldest child of B may live longer than twenty-one years. The
entire trust, unless it is found to be severable 3 7 will fail. If the trust
is found to be severable, the remainder to B's eldest child for life
would be valid so far as the rule against perpetuities is concerned,
because it must vest, if it is ever to vest, by the end of the lifetime of
B, who was living when the trust began. Under the suspension rule
the ultimate estate, and perhaps in consequence the whole trust, is
invalid, because the power of alienation may, according to the terms
of the trust, be suspended for longer than lifetimes of persons who
were living when the trust began; the remainder to B's eldest child
will also be invalid because it might last longer than twenty-one
years after B's death, if his eldest child should live more than twentyone years. It is doubtful whether the benefit, if any, of this extended
period outweighs the complexities which are introduced by the
parallel existence of both rules-the vesting rule and the rule against
suspension. It is equally doubtful whether the shortening of the
permissible duration is desirable, since a beneficiary who is only
twenty-one is not ordinarily well fitted to deal prudently with property. It is certain that no such distinction was intended by the introduction of the statutory rule against suspension. This undesirable
result of the shorter period of the suspension rule could be easily
avoided by extending the permissible period of suspension to lives
in being plus an additional consecutive term measured by the lifetime
47. On separability see 77 U. PA. L. BE~v. 523 (1929); 37 YALE L.J. 675 (1927).
Compare Ford v. Yost, 299 Ky. 682, 186 S.W.2d 896 (1944) (entire trust invalidated),
with In re Wanamaker's Estate, 335 Pa. 241, 6 A.2d 852 (1939) (only remainder

invalid).
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of the ultimate beneficiary. Another simple way of eliminating such
a discrepancy would be to provide for a period of suspension which
would end at the expiration of the time allowed for the vesting of
contingent future estates,4 as was done in a recent amendment to
the New York statute relating to accumulations.
C. LivITATIONS ON THE DURATION OF TRUSTS APART FROM THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND THE STATUTORY RULE AGAINST SUSPENSION

Apart from the rule against perpetuities and the statutory suspension
rule, any restriction on the permissible duration of indestructible
trusts must come from the common law policy against unduly protracted suspension of the power of alienation. Clearly such a policy
existed since very ancient times in English law. Both the rule against
perpetuities and the statutory suspension rule are devices to reduce
to more or less specific formulation this common law policy of encouraging alienability of property, which dates back to near the end
of the first century after the Norman Conquest. Early manifestations
of the policy were the enlargement of life estates held under tenants
in capite into estates of inheritance by the introduction of the conditional fee in the time of Henry II; the mortmain provisions of
Magna Charta and the Statute of Mortmain of 1279;49 D'Arunders
Case, 0 decided in 1225, establishing the right of an owner in fee
simple to alienate his property without the consent of his expectant
heirs; chapter 1 of Quia Emptores, 1290,5 which forbade the owner
of a fee simple, in alienating his property, to impose new obligations
of feudal tenure in his own favor; and the methods devised in the
late middle ages for escape from the effect of De Donis in validating
estates tail, culminating in Taltarum's Case52 and perpetuated in

modem statutes, in both England and in all of the states of the
United States, eliminating the fee tail. The policy still exists with
even more imperative need than in ancient times. Whether the policy
is reduced to specific formulation by rule or by statute is not especially
important.
Whether or not there is a policy against protracted suspension
applicable to indestructible trusts is not clearly decided by any
preponderance of authority.5 3 The scarcity of authority may be due to
the fact that the terminal point of duration would be established at
48. Chapters 453, 454, N.Y. Laws of 1959 as discussed by Pasley, The 1960
Amendment to the New York Statutes on Perpetuities and Powers of Appointment, 45
CORNELL L.Q. 679, 686 (1960).
49. 7 Edw. I.

50. Brac. N.B. 1054 (1225).
51. Statute of Westminster III, 1290, 18 Edw. 1, c. 1.
52. Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, 19 (1472).

53. See cases cited note 36 supra.
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all events by a measurement similar to that of the rule against perpetuities and the fact that in the absence of a rule against perpetuities
the statutory suspension rule, which adopts a substantially similar
measurement of the period of permissible duration of restraints on
the power of alienation, would merely shorten this duration in a
manner which is not particularly important, and which is perhaps not
particularly desirable, by cutting down the terminal period of a trust
to a period measured by a designated term of years instead of the
entire lifetime of the owner of the last contingent interest to vest.
Successive limitations of an indefinite series of life estates, either legal
or equitable, would obviously violate statutes abolishing the fee tail.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The difference which originally existed in the tests of suspension
established by the rule against perpetuities and the statutory suspension rule, which may have had a good deal to do with the retention
of both rules in the New York statutory system and in the systems
of the several other states which adopted the plan of the pilot statute
in New York, has long since been eliminated in the very common
situation of suspensions created by indestructible trusts. The former
distinction, originally devised because the test applied only to personal property, to which the vesting test was considered inapplicable,
cannot be accepted as a valid reason for the perpetuation of two
rules designed to accomplish exactly the same object-the timely
restoration of property to commerce. In no interpretation of the effect
of the two rules can both be necessary. In the case of limitations of
successive legal interests in property, the suspension rule is unnecessary if there is a vesting rule. Whether or not there is a suspension
rule, the existence of a vesting rule will curtail the period of suspension in the case of vested remainders or present estates. In the case
of contingent remainders, either rule will serve to limit the period
of suspension due to the presence of the contingent interest. In the
case of contingent interests in trust, the suspension rule requires that
the trust end by the time when a vesting must occur, since the existence of a contingency to vesting, whether due to uncertainty of ownership or of owners, itself impairs the power of alienation; thus making
a vesting requirement unnecessary. Moreover, apart from either rule,
the common law policy against protracted suspension would require
that the trust come to an end within a period to be prescribed either
by the courts or by the legislature, the length of which would depend on the policy of the governing jurisdiction as to the desirability
of permitting a trust to continue for the lifetime, or a part of it, of
the owner of the last beneficial interest to vest. The local policy
toward the desirability of trusts, which might lead to confining the
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class of potential beneficiaries either to living persons or to include
their immediate issue or other consecutive lives, would determine the
permissible duration.
There is thus no situation in which both rules, or indeed either rule,
would be necessary. If a choice is to be made, it would seem that the
suspension rule offers certain advantages. It covers all the situations
comprehended within the vesting requirement of the rule against
perpetuities and also the important additional area of vested and
contingent equitable interests in trust. I suggested several years ago4
that the vesting requirement if retained in addition to the statutory
suspension rule might possibly serve a useful purpose of furnishing
an obvious test of suspension, obviating the need for further investigation of that problem in any given case. Further reflection has led
me to feel that the vesting test, itself, involves the resolution of so
many imponderables that it is not easier, but often more difficult to
apply than the test of suspension. The suspension rule covers vested
and contingent interests, either legal or equitable, and thus covers
indestructible trusts of either vested or contingent interests. In eliminating the vesting test of suspension, it also avoids the difficulty
present in the application of the rule against perpetuities of choosing
between the alternatives of striking down a gift of a future interest
for a reason which may never come to pass or even in some situations
which events have shown did not come to pass, 55 or of leaving the

title in an indeterminate condition under the wait and see rule. The
only difference in the practical effect of the two rules is that the
suspension rule shortens the possible term of trusts by eliminating
all or part, depending on the local statute, of the terminal period
consisting of the lifetime of the owner of the last interest to vest
within the period of the rule against perpetuities. This period is
allowed if the vesting rule is the sole controlling factor with regard
to the permissible duration of trusts. The ideal solution must center
about a suspension rule establishing a permissible period of suspension
measured by the lifetime of persons who were living when the trust
began, or the lifetime of other persons born by the end of those lifetimes, or by a period of years to allow the second succession of
beneficiaries to attain an age when they may be expected to be
able to handle the property prudently; the trust to end by that time,
if not previously invalidated, if the provisions for termination have
already taken effect.
There is no doubt that we must have some fairly well-defined
standard for determining when a restraint on alienation lasts too
long. There is need for only one rule directed to the ultimate objec54.
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§ 336 (2d ed. 1955).

55. Merchants Nat'1 Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953).
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rive sought-the establishment of a limitation upon the period during
which alienability may be postponed. This limitation of the period
of permissible duration of the state of inalienability must apply to all
interests of any kind, present or future, vested or contingent, legal
or equitable, absolute or in trust. The test of suspension should be
the practical possibility, as well as the legal possibility, of alienation.
Such a rule would have the merit of attacking directly the object to
be attained, the establishment of a limitation on the period during
which absolute ownership may be postponed, rather than indirectly by
requiring the timely vesting of contingent interests, a phenomenon
which in itself is of no significance. The period to be adopted would
probably be either lives in being and an additional period of lives
which would follow without any interval of time the termination of
the lives in being, or if this period is deemed too long, merely an
additional period of years. The long period of experimentation with
different rules of evolving significance has probably been unavoidable,
but has had the result of giving rise, in determining the permissible
extent of control of property after ownership has been transferred, to
a heterogenous congeries of rules instead of a clearly envisaged unitary principle. Today we are in a position to re-draw these rules in
the form of a single, simple rule which will accomplish all the ends
which we have so long sought. All that is necessary is a rule to the
effect that restraints on the continuance of any interest in which the
power of alienation is restricted will not be valid unless they must
end within a designated period. A rule based on the test of suspension rather than of vesting, and thereby offering larger coverage,
directness of approach to the ultimate objective, and the elimination
of the uncertainty as to the duration of trusts created by the simultaneous operation of the vesting and the suspension rules, might be
formulated along the following lines:
"No limitation of an estate or interest in property, vested or contingent, legal or equitable, present or future, or of any right affecting
property which might, by any possibility, legal or practical, postpone
the absolute ownership of property for a period longer than the expiration of the lifetimes of persons living when the property is transferred by the former owner, and an additional period of thirty years,
shall be valid, unless, by the time the question is presented to a court
for decision, subsequent events have eliminated all uncertainty that
absolute ownership of the property will occur within the prescribed
period, or unless, by such time, the uncertainty has been eliminated.
This statute shall not be applied in such a manner as to disturb any
rights which may have accrued prior to the elimination of any uncertainty with regard to the ownership of any interest in or affecting
the property."

